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MAKING RAPISTS PAY: LESSONS FROM
THE BOSNIAN CIVIL WAR
WILLIAM M. WALKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Wartime rape has long been prohibited by international law.'
Wartime rapists,2 however, have all too often been able to avoid
prosecution for their crimes. 3 Human rights monitors even today
identify a disturbing "history of impunity" with respect to wartime
rape.4
Sadly, the record from the Bosnian Civil war has mirrored this
pattern5 despite the establishment of the International Tribunal
* Associate, Coudert Brothers, Los Angeles, CA; Adjunct Professor of International Law,
Whittier College School of Law. A.B., University of California, Davis; J.D., New York Uni-
versity School of Law.
1 See Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 Am.
J. INT'L L. 424, 425 (1993) [hereinafter Rape as a War Crime] (noting centuries old prohibi-
tion of rape by soldiers under both laws of war and national military codes).
2 See generally Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture, 45
DUKE L.J. 651, 692-98 (1996) (hypothesizing that wartime rape results, in part, from view
that military personnel are banded group with distinct cultural factors, which intensify in
combat situations).
3 See Leslie Wirpsa, New Study Documents Abuses of Women's Rights Worldwide, NAT'L
CATH. REP., Sept. 29, 1995, at 15, available in 1995 WL 12421341 (examining Human
Rights Global Report on Women's Human Rights' conclusion that abuses against women
have traditionally been excused or ignored).
4 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN.'S
HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (citing Preliminary Report Submitted by U.N. Special Rapporteur on Vio-
lence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Commission on Human Rights, 50'
Sess., at 64, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (1994) [hereinafter WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS]; see
also Elizabeth A. Kohn, Rape as a Weapon of War: Women's Human Rights During the
Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 199, 201-02 (1994) (asserting that
international community's failure to stop rape and forcible impregnation of women demon-
strates inherent problems with current international law); Sarah Jackson-Han, Human
Rights Watch Reports Rampant Abuses Against Women, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 2,
1995, available in 1995 WL 7851065 (reporting that study done by Human Rights Watch
determined governments around world commit and condone acts of violence against wo-
men); Connie Morella, Cultivating Common Ground, WASH. TIMEs, Sept. 8, 1995, at A17
(noting that rape remains accepted practice in many countries despite its prohibition under
all domestic and international laws); Wirpsa, supra note 3, at 15 (asserting that military
and political leaders mischaracterize and dismiss rape "as a private crime, a sexual act, the
ignoble act of the occasional soldier").
5 See Kohn, supra note 4, at 199 (estimating Serbian forces having raped between 20,000
and 50,000 Bosnian Muslim women).
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for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 ["Tribunal"]. 6 The Tribunal's
establishment in 1993 offered hope that rapists from that war,
and those with command responsibility who encouraged them,
would be brought to justice.7 This time things promised to be
different.
The Tribunal, however, has been unable to deliver on that
promise.' It is not that international law does not prohibit war-
time rape; it clearly does. It is not that the Tribunal's mandate to
prosecute rapists is too limited; it is not. Rather, as the Tribunal's
first trial has recently shown, rapists can avoid punishment by
intimidating witnesses and victims. 9 The ability of rapists to avoid
prosecution is also inextricably linked to the failure to indict more
suspects and make more arrests, 10 particularly of prominent in-
dictees such as former Bosnian Serb president Radovan
6 See id. at 201 (discussing international community's failure to alleviate problem); see
also Bruce Fein, A Sorry Surrogate for Bayonets; Indicting Bosnian Serbs for War Crimes
in a U.N. Tribunal, LEGAL TiMEs, Aug. 7, 1995, at 22 (calling international criminal tribu-
nal for former Yugoslavia "surrogate for bayonets" issuing idle indictments and only one
arrest).
7 See Sharon A. Healey, Prosecuting Rape Under the Statute of the War Crimes Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 327, 328 (1995) (noting Tribunal's recogni-
tion and prosecution of rape as war crime as both violation of Geneva Conventions and
crime against humanity); see also Michael A. Riccardi, U.S. Style Justice Tested in Bosnia
War Crimes Trial, Robreno System and Accused Both Face Judgment at the Hague, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 13, 1996, at 3 (examining tribunal and trial of Bosnian Serb
prison camp guard); Wirpsa, supra note 3, at 15 (reporting that abuses against women
have traditionally been excused or ignored).
8 See Kathleen M. Pratt & Laurel E. Fletcher, Time for Justice: The Case for Interna-
tional Prosecutions of Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 BERKE-
LEY WOMEN's L.J. 77, 79 (1994) (noting problems arise because rape is not deemed "crime
against humanity," is difficult to investigate, and is not prosecutable unless "mass and sys-
tematic"); see also Mark Rice-Oxley, Tribunal Depends on the Kindness of Foes, NATL L.J.,
June 3, 1996, at A10 (noting tribunal's failure to obtain physical custody of suspected
criminals before trial); Hartley Shawcross, Order NATO to Round Up Suspects Indicted for
War Crimes, IN'L HERALD TRIB., May 23, 1996, at 8 (predicting tribunal will fail unless it
can arrest and prosecute those indicted for serious war crimes in former Yugoslavia).
9 See Pratt & Fletcher, supra note 8, at 100 (noting reluctance on part of survivors of
rape to discuss it due to fear of retaliation and stigma associated with rape in Bosnian,
Croatian, and Serbian communities); see also Terry Atlas, U.N. Will Pursue War Crimes
Trials for Bosnia Rapes War Crimes, CHi. TRin., Jan. 30, 1994, at 1 (attributing rape survi-
vor's reluctance to talk to fear, stigmatization, and well-being of family members remaining
in Bosnia).
10 See Fein, supra note 6, at 22 (advocating use of force as most effective way to obtain
custody over indicted suspects); Rice-Oxley, supra note 8, at A10 (detailing Bosnian Serbs'
refusal to cooperate with tribunal along with U.N. Security Council's failure to invoke its
power).
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Karadzic" and former Bosnian Serb army commander Ratko
Mlatic. 12 As long as such individuals remain at large in Bosnia,' 3
they symbolize that there is no justice and that victims of war
crimes remain in danger.
The solutions for this dilemma are both simple and difficult and
apply not only to rape prosecutions, but to the prosecution of other
war crimes as well. All depend on the will of the international
community for their effective implementation.
Several things can be done. One is to arrest indicted rapists,
particularly high profile suspects. Not only will that hinder the
suspects' ability to intimidate or arrange for the intimidation of
victims and witnesses, it will increase the confidence of the vic-
tims and witnesses in the Tribunal. The Tribunal should also
have the authority to prosecute people who intimidate victims and
witnesses. Without such measures, the only way to insulate vic-
tims and witnesses from their tormentors is through relocation
and grants of asylum. The importance of ending the history of im-
punity for wartime rapists, and the magnitude of the crimes com-
mitted in Bosnia, demand decisive action.
II. THE PROBLEM
A. Rape as a Weapon in the Bosnian Civil War
Widespread, systematic rape calculated to attain strategic mili-
tary objectives characterized the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
From its outset, the war was waged:
[Algainst civilians who have been subjected to violent and
abusive practices on the basis of nationality. Crimes have
been committed by all sides, but the chief offenders have been
Serbian military and paramilitary forces. The aim of their vi-
cious policy of "ethnic cleansing" has been to rid an area of an
"enemy ethnic group" through murder, forced displacement,
11 See Philip Smucker, Support for Karadzic, NEWSDAY, July 14, 1997, at A5 (noting
Karadzic still remains at large and is popular with Bosnian Serbs). See generally Grace
Halsell, Human Rights Suit Came as Surprise to Bosnian Serb Leader, DALLAs MORNING
NEWS, Feb. 24, 1993, at A14 (writing of lawsuit filed in federal court in New York prepared
by three U.S. human rights groups on behalf of two Muslim teenagers alleging they were
raped by Serb militias controlled by Radovan Karadzic).
12 See Kohn, supra note 4, at 214 (noting prosecution of high level leaders may be com-
promised if peace treaty is worked out).
13 See, e.g., Richard Dicker, World Needs an International Criminal Court, NAT'L L.J.,
May 6, 1996, at A17 (contending that delays, inefficiency, and selectivity inherent in ad hoc
tribunals allow criminals to escape justice).
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deportation, detention or confinement to ghetto areas, de-
struction of villages and cultural and religious objects of the
"enemy" ethnic group. Mass rape of women has also been
used as a tool of "ethnic cleansing," meant to terrorize, torture
and demean women and their families and compel them to
flee the area.
14
"By attacking and terrorizing individual women, Serb soldiers
and paramilitary forces sen[t] the message to the entire commu-
nity that no one is or will be safe from violence. As a result, entire
families and villages have fled."' 6 Descriptions of the rapes make
grim reading. According to human rights monitors:
... [c]ombatants for each of the parties to the conflict in Bos-
nia-Hercegovina have raped women and girls in their homes,
in front of family members and in the village square. Women
have been arrested and raped during interrogation. In some
villages and towns, women and girls have been gathered to-
gether and taken to holding centers - often schools or com-
munity sports halls - where they are raped, gang-raped and
abused repeatedly, sometimes for days or even weeks at a
time. Other women have been taken seemingly at random
from their communities or out of a group of refugees with
whom they are traveling and raped by soldiers. Whether a
woman is raped by soldiers in her home or is held in a house
with other women and raped over and over again, she is raped
with a political purpose - to intimidate, humiliate and de-
grade her and others affected by her suffering. The effect of
rape is often to ensure that women and their families will flee
and never return. Rape by Bosnian Serb soldiers has been
particularly systematic and widespread. 6
Such abuses occurred with the apparent knowledge and ap-
proval of people with command responsibility. Bosnian Serb com-
manders, for example, allegedly claimed that the rape of Muslim
women was "good for raising the fighters' morale."' 7 Some such
14 See WoMA's HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 8-25 (asserting that mass rape is tool of
ethnic cleansing); see also Pratt & Fletcher, supra note 8, at 85-86 (detailing gender specific
atrocities committed by Bosnian Serbs).
15 WoMAN's HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 25 (reporting that fear of future violence
has spread through families and villages after women were raped); see also Pratt &
Fletcher, supra note 8, at 86 (noting rape created climate of fear in many villages).
16 WoMAN's HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 10.
17 See M.A. Stapleton, Panel Urges War-Crimes Prosecution in Rapes, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Apr. 5, 1996, at 3 (noting goal of bordello camps was not to punish women, but to
provide sex for men).
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individuals have denied the reports of mass rapes. 8 For example,
"Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, denied reports of
widespread rape by his troops, admitting only that 'psychopaths'
were responsible for less than twenty rapes."' 9 Such statements
do not withstand scrutiny:
The rape of women in an organized fashion - whether in
buildings where they are kept for the purpose of being raped
or in camps where they are detained with family members -
establishes that local commanders must know that their
soldiers are raping women and do nothing to stop these
abuses .20
Indeed, "[tihe public nature of the abuses and the frequency
with which they [took] place indicate[d] that individual soldiers
and military units [did] not anticipate disciplinary action by their
superiors."2 ' As of August 1995, "Human Rights Watch [was] not
aware of any case in which Bosnian Serb forces guilty of abuses
have been punished by their superiors for their crimes."22 Even
Serbs from Serbia were reported to have crossed the Bosnian bor-
der and "were responsible for looting, raping, beating and other-
wise terrorizing non-Serbs" in Bosnia.2"
B. The United Nations Act
Reports of the systematic and widespread use of these and other
crimes in Bosnia led to an international consensus on the need to
prosecute the perpetrators.24 Beginning in 1992, a string of
18 See Stephen Schwartz, Rape as a Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 HAS-
TINGS WoMEN's L.J. 69, 70 (1994) (stating that Serbian leaders denied that rapes
happened).
19 See WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 4 (citing Roy Gutman, Rape Camps:
Evidence in Bosnia Mass Attacks Points to Karadzic's Pale, NEWSDAY, Apr. 19, 1993, at 7,
31). But see Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, War Crimes Jurisdiction, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
25, 1995, at 3 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1996)) (reporting on allega-
tions that Karadzic "personally planned and ordered a campaign of murder, rape, forced
impregnation, and other forms of torture designed to destroy the religious and ethnic
groups of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. .
20 WoMEN's HumAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 10.
21 Id. at 9.
22 Id.
23 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORID REPORT: 1996 203 (1995) (dis-
cussing human rights developments in Bosnia-Hercegovina throughout 1994-95).
24 See Jennifer Green et al., Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and Other
Gender-Based Violence Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via: A Feminist Proposal and Critique, 5 HASTINGS WoMN's L.J. 171, 175 (1994) (noting
pronounced international outcry for action to punish human rights violators in former Yu-
goslavia to put pressure on U.N. to establish international tribunal).
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United Nations Security Council resolutions condemned in in-
creasingly strong language the brutality of the Bosnian war, par-
ticularly the practice of ethnic cleansing and its inherent abuse of
civilians.2" A report from the Commission of Experts established
by the U.N. Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Reso-
lution 780 confirmed the widespread use of rape as part of the
phenomenon of "ethnic cleansing."26
Finally, in 1993, the United Nations Security Council decided
"that an international tribunal shall be established for the prose-
cution of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia since 1991. " 27 Again, after strongly condemning ethnic
cleansing and the "massive, organized and systematic detention
and rape of women,"28 the Security Council, on May 25, 1993, for-
mally endorsed the recommendations of the Secretary-General on
the structure, jurisdiction and competence of the Tribunal.2 9 The
first international court for the prosecution of war crimes since the
World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals was born and the
stage was set for it to begin the prosecution of, among other
things, rape as a war crime.3 °
C. The Tribunal Acts
After a series of delays caused by the selection of judges, the
drafting of rules of procedure and evidence, and a first prosecutor
25 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 3093rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/764 (1992), re-
printed in 31 I.L.M. 1427, 1465 (stating Council's deep concern for deteriorating conditions
in Sarajevo); S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 3106' mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992), reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 1427, 1470 (1992) ("[elxpressing grave alarm at continuing reports" of human
rights violations, Security Council "widely condemns ... the practice of'ethnic cleansing');
S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 3119' mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992) reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
1427, 1476 (1992) (urging creation of Commission of Experts to analyze information sub-
mitted regarding activity in former Yugoslavia).
26 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
780, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994).
27 See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 49' Sess., 3175" mtg., at 28, U.N. Doc. 5/INF/49
(1994); see also Kohn, supra note 4, at 216-17 (enumerating aims of Tribunal established by
U.N. Security Council).
28 S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 48' Sess., 3200th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (1993).
29 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48' Sess., 3217' mtg., Res. & Dec., at 29, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
49 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993).
30 See William M. Walker, War Crimes and Punishment, L.A. LAw., Sept. 1996, at 28, 29
[hereinafter War Crimes and Punishment].
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who critics claimed did "nothing",3 ' the Tribunal's energetic sec-
ond chief prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, finally began to indict
suspects, including for rape.32 Human rights monitors applauded
["t]he stated commitment of the judges and chief prosecutor for
the war crimes tribunal ... to prosecuting rape as a war crime," a
commitment that marked "a critical turn away from accepting
rape in war."3 3
Early indictments charged that in May 1992, Muslim residents
were forced to flee their homes when Bosnian Serb forces began
intensive shelling of Muslim areas in the Opstina Prijedor in Bos-
nia-Hercegovina. Many Muslims surrendered or were captured by
Serb forces. The Serbs then led the Muslims and any Croats they
could locate to nearby Serb prison camps. En route, many Mus-
lims and Croats were allegedly pulled from the marching columns,
beaten and shot on the spot.3 4
From approximately May until August of 1992, Serb forces con-
fined more than 3,000 of these Muslims and Croats in a camp situ-
ated in a former mining complex at Omarska near the town of
Prijedor.35 Approximately forty women were detained at Omar-
ska; the remaining prisoners were men.3 6 There, the Serb forces
allegedly "killed, raped, sexually assaulted, beat and otherwise
mistreated the prisoners."3 7 Rapes were purportedly committed
"regularly and openly" at the Omarska camp.38 Both male and fe-
31 D. Cassell Commentary, World Views: Yugoslavia. Will War Criminals Be Prose-
cuted?, at 2 (National Public Radio broadcast, July 13, 1994) (transcript on file at DePaul
University International Human Rights Law Institute).
32 See Indictment of Nikolic, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 996, 996-1010 (1995). Dragan Nikolic
was charged with grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, violations of laws or
customs of war, and crimes against humanity against the civilian population. Id. The first
indictment did not issue until November 7, 1994. Id.
33 WoMEN's HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 4. But see Kohn, supra note 4, at 202 (re-
porting that Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic has vowed that Serb-controlled terri-
tory in Bosnia will not cooperate in extradition of suspects).
34 See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Indictments Against
Meakic & Others & Tadic & Others, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1011, 1014, par. 2.1; 1028, par.
2.1 (1995) [hereinafter Meakic Indictment & Tadic Indictment] (recounting events of May
1992).
35 See id. at 34 I.L.M. at 1034, par. 1, 1028, par. 1 (detailing events of May 25, 1992).
36 See id. at 1014, par. 2.3, 1029, par. 2.3 (asserting that Serb forces rounded up Muslims
and Croats and sent them to camps).
37 See id. at 1014, par. 1, 1029, par. 2.6 (detailing assaults that were committed in Omar-
ska "camp").
38 See Meakic Indictment, supra note 34, at 1017, par. 19.2 (charging Meakic's subordi-
nates with war crimes).
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male prisoners were victims. 3 9 According to his indictment,
Mladen Radic, a commander who supervised one of the three
shifts of guards at the Omarska camp,40 was one of the alleged
perpetrators:
During June and July, 1992, Mladen Radic repeatedly sub-
jected "A" to forcible sexual intercourse. The first occasion
was on or about the night of 25 June 1992. Mladen Radic took
"A" to a room downstairs in the administration building,
forced her on a table and subjected her to forcible sexual in-
tercourse. Two or three nights later, Radic again called "A"
out of the room where she slept and again subjected her to
forcible sexual intercourse. On at least three more occasions
during June and July 1992, Mladen Radic called "A" out of the
room in the administration building where she slept and sub-
jected her to forcible sexual intercourse.4 1
The indictment further alleged that between early June and Au-
gust 3, 1992, a guard named Gruban on Radic's shift "repeatedly
forced 'F' from the room where she was sleeping, took her to an-
other room on the first floor of the administration building in the
Omarska camp and subjected her to forcible sexual intercourse."42
The indictment alleged that the ordeal of the woman known as "F"
continued at the hands of other Serbs at the Omarska camp:
-Between early June and 3 August 1992, Predrag Kostic, a
guard at the Omarska camp, forced 'F' from the room where
she was sleeping, took her to another room on the first floor
of the administration building in the Omarska camp and
subjected her to forcible sexual intercourse; 43
-Sometime between early June and 3 August 1992, "F" was
taken to the Separacija building at the entrance to the
39 See id. at 1014, par. 2.6, 1029, par. 2.6 (alleging assaults against both men and wo-
men); see also Laurel Fletcher et al., No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and
Gender-Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 HASTINGS WoMEN's L.J. 89, 95 (1994)
[hereinafter No Justice, No Peace] (asserting there is evidence that Muslim men were also
subjected to various forms of sexual assault); Schwartz, supra note 18, at 70. (claiming
women, girls, children, and men have all been victims of sexual terror).
40 See Meakic Indictment & Tadic Indictment, supra note 34, at 1015, par. 6 (noting
Meakic's position as shift commander gave him great authority).
41 Id. at 1019, par. 22.1 (relating charges brought against Mladen Radic).
42 Id. at 1023, par. 25.1 (recounting Gruban's repeated rape of "F" between early June
and August 3, 1992).
43 Id. at 1024, par. 26.1 (recounting abuse of "F" by Kostic, another guard).
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Omarska camp and placed in a room where Mirko Babic
subjected "F" to forcible sexual intercourse. 44
-Sometime between early June and 3 August 1992, "F" was
taken to the Separacija building at the entrance to the
Omarska camp and placed in a room where Dusan Tadic
subjected "F" to forcible sexual intercourse.45
The camp commanders, deputies, guard shift commanders,
their subordinates and others were also indicted because of their
alleged roles as "part of a widespread or large-scale or systematic
attack directed against a civilian population, specifically the Mus-
lim and Croat population of the Prijedor district."46
D. Setbacks to Prosecution
In May 1996, the Tribunal began its first trial, that of Dusan
Tadic. 47 Tadic, among other things, was a guard at the Omarska
camp who was indicted for his alleged commission of the rape of
the woman known as "F".48 The Tadic trial was to have been the
first in which rape was prosecuted as a war crime by an interna-
tional tribunal in Europe. Unfortunately, the prosecution was
forced to drop the rape charge because the victim refused to tes-
tify, claiming that threats had been made against her and her
family.4 9
That failure was a serious setback for the Tribunal, which by
the end of 1996, had indicted 74 suspects but had been able to
44 Id. at 1026, par. 30.1. (noting charge against Babic, who was not guard at camp, but
was one of group of other Serbs who allegedly, with permission of camp commanders, en-
tered camp "where they beat or otherwise physically abused prisoners"); id. at 1015, par. 8
(noting accused who entered camp and abused prisoners).
45 Tadic Indictment, supra note 34, at 1013, par. 4.1 (recounting purported Tadic abuse
of "F").
46 Meakic Indictment, supra note 34, at 1016, par. 15 (noting alleged crimes against hu-
manity were part of systematic attack against civilians).
47 See War Crimes and Punishment, supra note 30, at 30; see also Riccardi, supra note 7,
at 3 (noting trial against Dusan Tadic, accused of murder, sexual assault and crimes
against humanity).
48 Tadic Indictment, supra note 34, at 1030, pars. 4.1-4.2.
49 See Tyler Marshall, International Court Opens Bosnia War Crimes Trial, L.A. TIMES,
May 8, 1996, at A7. "The fact that witnesses have said they wouldn't testify because of
fears for their family is an indicator that the presence of senior officials still at large not
only undercuts human rights in the former Yugoslavia but also hampers the work of the
tribunal." Id. (citing Richard Dicker, an associate counsel at Human Rights Watch in New
York).
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prosecute only two5 ° and had only seven in custody.51 It was an
even more serious setback for the prosecution of rape in Bosnia.
That was not the only problem with the prosecution of Tadic.
One of the prosecution's star witnesses recanted his testimony
against Tadic, maintaining that he had been forced to lie by the
Bosnian Muslim police.52
III. THE LAW
A. Modern International Legal Standards Clearly Prohibit
Wartime Rape
Modern humanitarian law leaves little doubt that wartime rape
is illegal.53
Rape in internal armed conflicts such as the Bosnian civil war is
prohibited by Article 3 common to all four of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. Common Article 3 by its terms applies to "armed
conflict not of an international character."5 4 Although rape is not
50 See Tracy Wilkinson, Bosnia Croat Sentenced in Massacre War Crimes: Ex-soldier
Gets Ten Years in Killings of Muslims at Srebrenica, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1996, at A13. The
other prosecution involved Drazen Erdemovic, a Bosnian Croat in the Bosnian Serb armed
forces involved in the massacre of Bosnian Muslims after the Bosnian Serbs captured the
United Nations "safe haven" of Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia in 1995. Id. Erdemovic coop-
erated with prosecutors and pled guilty to the indictment against him. Id. On November
29, 1996 he was sentenced to ten years in prison. Id. Erdemovic's case marked the first
international sentencing for war crimes since the end of World War II. Id.
51 See DIE ZEIT, Nov. 8, 1996, at 1. As of November, 1996, 74 purported war criminals
had been indicted but only seven were in custody. Id.; Bosnian Croats Surrender to U.N.
War Crimes Tribunal, BALT. SuN, Oct. 7, 1997, at A9. This number has slightly improved;
today, of 77 indicted suspects, 20 are in custody. Id.; see also James Podgers, The World
Cries for Justice, 82 APR-A.B.A. J. 52, 53 (1996). Tadic later became the first person con-
victed of war crimes by the international tribunal. Id.; Lauren Comiteau & Gilliam Sharpe,
Serb Gets 20 Years for War Crimes, NEWSDAY, July 15, 1997, at A7. He was sentenced to 20
years in prison. Id.
52 DIE ZEIT, Nov. 8, 1996, at 1 (one of prosecution's chief witnesses recanted his testi-
mony, maintaining that Bosnian Muslim police had forced him to lie).
53 See Rape as a War Crime, supra note 1, at 425. "Rape by soldiers has of course been
prohibited by the law of war for centuries, and violators have been subjected to capital
punishment under national military codes, such as those of Richard 11 (1385) and Henry V
(1419)." Id.; see also THEODOR MERON, HENRY'S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAWS: PERSPEC-
TWVES ON THE LAW OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 143-144 (1993) [hereinafter HENRY'S
WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAWS]; Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies
of the United States in the Field, art. 44, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLIcTS 3
(Detrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1988). The Lieber Instructions, written to govern the
conduct of the U.S. armed forces in the U.S. Civil War, also explicitly prohibited rape. Id.
54 Geneva Convention for the Protection of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3116-18, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32-34 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3220-22,
75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86-88 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,
136-38 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
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prohibited by name in Common Article 3, that article prohibits
"violence to life and person" and "outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment" against
"[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities."55 The basic,
minimum rights guaranteed by Common Article 3 have achieved
such universal and unquestioned recognition that Common Arti-
cle 3 has been found by the International Court of Justice to be
customary international law. 56 The language of Common Article 3
unambiguously covers rape, which by its nature is an extremely
violent crime and is arguably the worst "outrage upon personal
dignity" imaginable.
Other international humanitarian law specifically prohibits
rape in internal armed conflicts. For example, the Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,
288-90 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. Common article 3 reads:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or
wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and persons, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guar-
antees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for...
Id.
55 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 54 (delineating provisions that bind each party
in conflict); see also THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMEs 283 (Roger S. Clark &
Madeline Sann eds., 1992) (referring to ruling from International Court of Justice in Nicar.
v. U.S. that Common Article 3 principles constitute "elementary consideration of human-
ity" that should not be breached in armed conflict regardless of its national or international
character).
56 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Ni-
car. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 219-221 (noting that U.S. government and International Com-
mittee of Red Cross also view rape as war crime under customary law and as such its
prohibition is binding even on non-parties to Geneva Conventions). See Theodor Meron,
The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 122, 131 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Case for Trials] (describing recognition of minimum rights provisions in Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention as being widely recognized).
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flicts 57 states in article 4 (2) that "the following acts ... are and
shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever:
... (e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any
form of indecent assault . . . ." Protocol II specifically mentioned
rape because it was deemed necessary to "reaffirm [ I and supple-
ment[ I Common Article 3 ... [because] it became clear that it was
necessary to strengthen ... the protection of women ... who may
also be the victims of rape."5 8
In addition, Article 27 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949
specifically states that "[w]omen shall be especially protected
against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, en-
forced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault."59
Furthermore, Article 146 of Geneva Convention IV requires
parties to the Convention "to enact any legislation necessary to
provide effective penal sanctions" for persons committing "grave
breaches" of the Convention as defined in Article 147.60 Although
Article 147 does not specifically list rape as a grave breach, it does
57 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec.
12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 June 8, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Protocol
II]. The former Yugoslavia ratified Protocol II in 1978; Bosnia-Hercegovina ratified it in
1992. Healey, supra note 7, at 348-49.
58 ICRC COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1375 (Y. Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). It is regrettable, how-
ever, that the only place where rape is specifically prohibited in Protocol II is in the article
concerning outrages on personal dignity. Id. Rape is not merely an outrage on personal
dignity; it is an extremely violent act that very often causes serious physical, not to men-
tion mental, harm to the victim. Id. As such, it should also have been specifically included
in article 4(2)(a) of Protocol II, which prohibits "violence to the life, health and physical or
mental well-being of persons... ." Id.; C.P.M. Cleiren and M.E.M. Tijssen, Rape and Other
Forms of Sexual Assault in the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Legal, Proce-
dural, and Evidentiary Issue, 5 CRiM. L.F. 471, 491 (1994). In any event, the more general
language of article 4(2)(a) is certainly broad enough to cover rape. Id.
59 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 54, at 306, art. 27, 3536. Other international hu-
manitarian instruments also specifically prohibit rape. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1395. It is
stated that "[w]omen shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in particu-
lar against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault." Id.; Healey,
supra note 7, at 348. The former Yugoslavia ratified the four Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 in 1950 and Protocol I in 1978. Id. Bosnia-Herzegovina ratified them in 1992.
Id. at 349.
60 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 54, art. 146. Article 146 contains provisions
which require that parties enact legislation to sanction offenders of the convention. Id.; see
also Healy, supra note 7, at 341. Among other things, universal jurisdiction exists for the
trial of individuals who commit grave breaches because of the particularly serious nature of
those war crimes. Id. Parties to the Geneva Conventions must search for and either try
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list "torture or inhuman treatment" as well as "wilfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health."61 There can be
little doubt that rape is inhuman and causes great suffering or
serious injury to body or health. "Indeed, under the weight of the
events in the former Yugoslavia, the hesitation to recognize that
rape can be a ... grave breach has already begun to dissipate."62
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the former Yugo-
63 Avaiuslavia, and various states64 aided this development by adopting
an appropriately broad construction of existing law. "The ICRC
declared that the grave breach of 'wilfully causing great suffering
or serious injury to body or health' . covers rape."65
Article 2 of Geneva Convention IV states that articles 27 and
147 apply by their terms "to all cases of declared war or any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties" to the Convention. 66 This means that, ac-
cording to the Convention's text, those articles apply only to inter-
national, and not internal, armed conflicts. Despite the language
of article 2, however, United Nations Security Council resolutions
have repeatedly stated that the grave breach provisions also apply
criminals themselves or turn the criminals over to a party or international tribunal that
will. Id.
61 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 54, art. 147.
62 See Rape as a War Crime, supra note 1, at 426 (citing ICRC, Aide-Memoire (Dec. 3,
1992)) (noting that ICRC adopted broad construction of existing law); see also Cleiren &
Tijssen, supra note 58, at 491-92 (supporting characterization of sexual assault as "a grave
breach" under Article 2).
63 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1992/S-1i1 of 14, U.N. ESCOR Commission on
Human Rights, 49' Sess., Agenda Item 27, at par. 89, U.N. Doc. E/CN.411993/50 (1993).
64 The United States State Department also considers rape to be a grave breach of Ge-
neva Convention IV. See Letter from A. Bradtke, Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative
Affairs, to Senator Arlen Specter (Jan. 27, 1993), reprinted in Rape as a War Crime, supra
note 1, at 427 n.22. With respect to the Bosnian war in particular, the State Department
has declared that "[in our reports to the United Nations on human rights violations in the
former Yugoslavia, we have reported sexual assaults as grave breaches. We will continue to
do so and will continue to press the international community to respond to the terrible
sexual atrocities in the former Yugoslavia." Id.; see also Case for Trials, supra note 56, at
131.
65 Rape as a War Crime, supra note 1, at 426 (citing ICRC, Aide-Memoire (Dec. 3, 1992)).
The ICRC declared that "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health" constitutes rape. Id.
66 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 54, at 3518. Article 2 of the statute gives the Tribu-
nal "the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949." Id. See Cleiren & Tijssen, supra note 58, at
491. The author discusses the Tribunal's power to prosecute violations of law or customs of
war. Id.
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to the Bosnian Civil war, thus providing a solid basis for applying
them to that conflict.
Not only does rape constitute a war crime under, and grave
breach of, Geneva Convention IV and its 1977 Protocols, "the mas-
sive and systematic practice of rape and its use as a 'national' in-
strument of 'ethnic cleansing' qualify it to be defined and prose-
cuted as a crime against humanity."6 7 Crimes against humanity
were first spelled out by the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg.6" Building on language in the preamble
of, for example, the 1907 Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land,69 the identification of
crimes against humanity by the Nuremberg Charter provided for,
among other things, criminal penalties against individuals for the
abuse of a state's own citizens. 70
That, however, entails a tougher burden of proof than other war
crimes, 7 1 requiring that:
1. The specific crimes are committed as a part of "state action
or policy;" 2. The action or policy is based on discrimination-
persecution against an identifiable group of persons; 3. The
acts committed are otherwise crimes in the national criminal
laws of that state; [and] 4. They are committed by the state
67 Rape as a War Crime, supra note 1, at 426-27 (pointing out that hesitation recognizing
rape as war crime or grave breach has begun to dissipate in Yugoslavia).
68 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1544,
1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284 (1946). The Nuremberg Charter did not specifically list rape as
a crime against humanity. Id. However, Control Council Law No. 10, which was adopted by
the Allied occupying powers in Germany to regulate war crimes trials in their own courts,
did specifically list rape as a crime against humanity. Control Council for Germany, OFFI-
CIAL GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1946, at 50.
69 See, e.g., Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, 2280, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631, 633 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
In cases not included in the Regulations ... the inhabitants and the belligerents re-
main under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they
result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity,
and the dictates of the public conscience.
Id.
70 See Healy, supra note 7, at 352. The Allied Powers justified this view of international
law by claiming these crimes could be punished by international courts because the con-
duct, by its nature, offended humanity. Id. The prohibition of crimes against humanity is
now part of customary international law. Id.
71 See Rape as a War Crime, supra note 1, at 428 (noting that crimes against humanity
are more difficult to establish due to burden of proving systematic government planning,
which is not necessary element of war crimes).
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officials or their agents in furtherance of state action or
policy .... 72
Clearly, the above descriptions of rape committed as part of eth-
nic cleansing, which has been "particularly systematic and wide-
spread,"73 qualifies as a crime against humanity.74
Other humanitarian law applicable to international armed con-
flicts also prohibits rape. The 1907 Hague Regulations annexed to
Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land provide in article 46 that "[flamily honor and rights, the
lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convic-
tions and practice, must be respected."7 Broadly construed, this
article prohibits rape, "but in practice it has seldom been so inter-
preted."7 6 Despite its vague language, Article 46 should be so in-
terpreted, particularly in light of other provisions of the Hague
Regulations. 77 For example, the preamble of the Hague Conven-
tion (No. IV) contains the so-called "Martens Clause," which reads:
... in cases not included in the Regulations ... the inhabit-
ants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the
rule of the principles of the laws of nations, as they result
72 See Healey, supra note 7, at 352 (listing legal elements needed to charge crimes
against humanity); see also M. CHERIF BASsIoUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 248 (1992).
73 WOMENS' HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 10.
74 See Case for Trials, supra note 56, at 132 (asserting that there is no reason why rape
should not be seen as torture or inhumane treatment).
75 Oct. 18, 1907, 36(2) Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague
Regulations].
76 See Rape as a War Crime, supra note 1, at 425 (noting that rape was neither men-
tioned in Nuremberg Charter nor prosecuted at Nuremberg trials).
77 See Healy, supra note 7, at 351-52. At least one scholar asserts that it is "unwise to
bend the meaning of article 46 to encompass rape as a violation of family honor in contra-
vention of the laws and customs of war" based on the logic that such an interpretation
would perpetuate the erroneous view that rape is a crime only against family honor and not
against the woman herself. Id. It is absolutely correct that rape should under no circum-
stances be mischaracterized simply as a crime against family honor, and that attitudes
should be adjusted to focus attention on rape as a crime against the victim who, after all, is
the one who has been raped. Id. It is likewise correct, however, that rape is unique in its
ability to harm the victim both physically, mentally and in terms of personal dignity and
family honor. Id. at 350. As a result, it is appropriate for international law to recognize and
condemn each way in which the crime can harm an individual. Id.; Hague Convention,
supra note 69, 36 Stat. at 2280. In any event, as shown elsewhere herein, the 1907 Hague
Convention, through the Martens Clause, also contains a provision, albeit vague, that can
be used to condemn rape as contrary to "the usages established among civilized peoples,
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." Id. Because such
sources also condemn rape as a violent crime, the Hague Regulations, through the Martens
clause, can also be read to condemn that aspect of rape. Id.; see, e.g., infra notes 79 to 81
and accompanying text.
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from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."v
Although commentators have cast doubt on the legally binding
character of this provision due to its inclusion in the Convention's
preamble as opposed to its text,7 9 the Nuremberg Tribunal used
the Martens Clause as the basis for applying customary law, the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience to an
actual case not covered by other conventional obligations.8 0 As dis-
cussed previously with respect to Common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, the prohibition of rape during wartime is
customary international law. Thus, under the Martens Clause,
the commission of rape during wartime also violated the Hague
Regulations."1
Therefore, the laws of war clearly prohibit rape in general and
in internal armed conflict such as the Bosnian civil war in particu-
lar. The successful prosecution of rapists from the Bosnian Civil
war before the tribunal would further cement that conclusion.
B. The Tribunal is Equipped to Prosecute Violations of the Law
The Tribunal has the potential to conduct such successful
prosecutions.
78 Hague Convention, supra note 69, 36 Stat. at 2280 (providing that unforeseen cases
should not be left to arbitrary judgment of military commanders).
79 Shigeki Miyazaki, The Martens Clause and International Humanitarian Law, in
STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIAN LAw AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN
HONOR OF JEAN PICTET 433, 436 (Christopher Swinarski ed., 1984) (asserting that pream-
ble clause merely shows standard by which to interpret main text of treaty).
80 See 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1341
(1950). In United States v. Krupp, the Nuremberg Tribunal stated that the Martens clause:
... is much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause, making the usages
established among civilized nations, the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public
conscience into the legal yardstick to be applied if and when the specific provisions of
the [Hague] Convention and Regulations annexed to it do not cover specific cases oc-
curring in warfare, or concomitant to warfare.
Id. "The Martens clause is therefore a serious legal obligation." Id.; see also William M.
Walker, The International Law Applicable to Guerrilla Movements in Internal Armed Con-
flicts: A Case Study of Contra Attacks on Nicaraguan Farming Cooperatives, 21 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 147, 154-55 nn.45-46 (1988). As shown elsewhere herein, the Martens
clause also applies to internal armed conflicts. Id.
81 Indeed, any other interpretation of the Hague Regulations is simply not credible. It
cannot be argued, for example, that a group of soldiers that break into a woman's home and
then gang rapes her has not violated the Hague Regulations, but that they have violated
the Regulations if they then steal her videocassette recorder. Hague Regulations, supra
note 75, art. 46, 36 Stat. at 2306-07 (stating "private property cannot be confiscated"); Id. at
art. 47, 36 Stat. at 2307 (declaring "[plillage is formally forbidden").
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1. The Tribunal's Statute
The Statute of the Tribunal contains all of the tools necessary to
indict rapists on a number of different legal theories. The Secre-
tary-General, finding that Geneva Convention No. IV, the Hague
Regulations and the Nuremberg charter constitute customary in-
ternational law, utilized these documents in formulating the Stat-
ute that defines the crimes that the Tribunal will prosecute. 2
Article 2 of the Statute, which gives the Tribunal the authority
to prosecute grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, pro-
vides for the prosecution of persons "committing or ordering to be
committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 Au-
gust 1949, namely ... (c) wilfully causing great suffering or seri-
ous injury to body or health ... 3 For example, Dusan Tadic, for
his alleged rape of "F", was indicted for "wilfully causing great suf-
fering to 'F' by subjecting her to forcible sexual intercourse, a
GRAVE BREACH recognised by Article 29c) of the statute of the
Tribunal."84
Article 3 of the Statute, which provides for the prosecution of
violations of the laws and customs of war as set forth in the 1907
Hague Regulation,15 has also been used by the tribunal to indict
rapists and so, at last, interprets the Hague Regulations as
prohibiting wartime rape. Accordingly, Dusan Tadic's indictment
alleged that he "subjected 'F' to cruel treatment by forcible sexual
intercourse, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF
WAR recognized by article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal and
article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. " 6
82 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Reso-
lution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, art. 3, 3217 mtg., at 35, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1170 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report].
83 See id. at 37-40 (granting International Tribunal power to prosecute for grave
breaches, as listed under 1949 Geneva Convention).
84 See Tadic Indictment, supra note 34, at 1030, par. 4.2 (listing charges against Dusan
Tadic).
85 See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 82, at 41-44 (setting forth violation of laws
or customs of war as adopted under 1907 Hague Convention (IV)).
86 Tadic Indictment, supra note 34, at 1030, par. 4.3. See Secretary General's Report,
supra note 82, at 44. Regrettably, Article 3 does not specifically mention that it covers rape:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the
laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unneces-
sary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity;
(c) attack, bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwell-
ings, or buildings;
19971
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Article 5 provides yet another basis upon which to indict rape:
as a crime against humanity. In his report transmitting the Tri-
bunal's draft statute to the Security Council, the Secretary-Gen-
eral found that ["i]n the conflict in the territory of the former Yu-
goslavia, such inhumane acts have taken the form of so-called
'ethnic cleansing' and widespread and systematic rape and other
forms of sexual assault, including enforced prostitution."8 7 Article
5 thus provides that ["tihe International tribunal shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for . . . (g) rape.""8 Mr.
Tadic was, accordingly, also indicted because he allegedly "raped
'F', a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY recognised by Article 5 (g) of
the Statute of the Tribunal."8 9
2. The Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence
In his Report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General
aptly noted that "[i]n the light of the particular nature of the
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, it will be necessary
for the International Tribunal to ensure the protection of victims
and witnesses ... especially in cases of rape or sexual assault."90
Accordingly, article 22 of the Tribunal's Statute provided that
"[tihe International tribunal shall provide in its rules of procedure
and evidence for the protection of victims and witnesses. Such
protection measures shall include, but shall not be limited to, the
conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the victim's
identity."91 In fulfilling this portion of its mandate, the tribunal
(d) seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated to reli-
gion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of
art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.
Id. In leaving rape out of Article 3, the Secretary-General missed a good opportunity to
make a strong explicit statement that the Hague Regulations prohibit wartime rape. How-
ever, the prosecutor's use of the first sentence of Article 3 of the statute to cover rape in
indicting rape suspects is justified by the Hague Regulations, whether throughout Article
46 or through the Martens clause combined with the customary law prohibition against
"violence to life and person." Id.; Hague Regulations, supra note 75, 36 Stat. at 2306-07.
87 See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 82, at 48 (describing actions constituting
crimes against humanity).
88 Id. at 49 (setting forth International Tribunal's power to prosecute persons for crimes
against humanity).
89 Tadic Indictment, supra note 34, at 1030, par. 4.4.
90 See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 82, at 108 (noting need to protect witnesses
and victims when trying criminals for crimes committed in former Yugoslavia).
91 See id. par. 109 (proscribing rules for protection of victims and witnesses by allowing
in camera proceedings and anonymous testimony).
[Vol. 12:449
MAKING RAPISTS PAY
adopted several significant procedural and evidentiary protections
for victims and witnesses.
For example, Rule 69, entitled "Protection of Victims and Wit-
nesses," provides that:
(A) In exceptional circumstances, the Prosecutor may apply
to a Trial chamber to order non-disclosure of the identity of a
victim or witness who may be in danger or at risk until such
person is brought under the protection of the Tribunal.
(C) Subject to Rule 75, the identity of the victim or witness
shall be disclosed in sufficient time prior to the trial to allow
adequate time for preparation of the defense. 92
Rule 75, also entitled "Protection of Victims and Witnesses,"
provides that the Tribunal can enter appropriate orders to protect
victims and witnesses so long as they are "consistent with the
rights of the accused." 93 Rule 75(B) expands on that provision by
providing for hearings on whether it is necessary to prevent the
disclosure to the public or media of a witness' or victim's identity
or location or the identity or location of "persons related to or asso-
ciated with" the victim or witness.94 Names could be expunged
from the tribunal's public records,9 5 testimony could be given us-
ing image or voice-altering devices,96 or pseudonyms could be
assigned.9 7
Controls also exist on the type of evidence that can be presented
in rape cases. Rule 96, entitled "Evidence in Cases of Sexual As-
sault," provides: "In cases of sexual assault: (i) no corroboration of
the victim's testimony shall be required; (ii) consent shall not be
all owed as a defence; (iii) prior sexual conduct of the victim shall
not be admitted in evidence." 98 This provision in particular is a
92 See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Vio-
lations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo-
slavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), Rule 65(B),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 484, 521 (1994) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure and Evidence]
(describing rule that release may be ordered only in exceptional circumstances, provided
accused's appearance is guaranteed and will not pose danger to any victim).
93 Id. Rule 75(A), 33 I.L.M. at 527 (noting judge may enter these orders at request of
either party).
94 Id. Rule 75(B)(i), 33 I.L.M. at 527 (discussing use of ex parte hearings to determine
what information to withhold from public).
95 Id. Rule 75(B)(i)(a), 33 I.L.M. at 527 (proscribing that witness names can be withheld
from public records).
96 Id. Rule 75(B)(i)(c), 33 I.L.M. at 527.
97 Id. Rule 75(B)(i)(d), 33 I.L.M. at 527.
98 Id. Rule 96, 33 I.L.M. at 535-36.
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welcome innovation and removes many obstacles that can deter
rape victims from testifying.
Other provisions of the tribunal's rules of procedure and evi-
dence also protect rape victims and witnesses. For example, re-
lease of a suspect by the tribunal pending trial may be ordered
"only in exceptional circumstances, and only if it is satisfied that
the accused ... will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or
other person."99 The Tribunal has even established a Victims and
Witnesses Unit that recommends protective measures for victims
and witnesses and provides "counseling and support for them, es-
pecially in cases of rape and sexual assault."'00 Such a unit
greatly helps rape victims cope with both the stigma that unjustly,
but often, attaches to them, and with the understandable trauma
they suffer in living with their ordeal.
All of these provisions are obviously worthwhile. Are they
enough to ensure the successful prosecution of rape as a war
crime? The answer is no.
C. "Enforcement". A History of Tolerance
The history with respect to enforcing the prohibition of wartime
rape has been one of tolerance. The Tribunal so far has been un-
able to do much to change that.
Despite the centuries-old prohibition of rape during wartime,
"until recently, it has not been condemned like any other abuse.
The differential treatment of rape makes clear that the problem -
for the most part - lies not in the absence of adequate legal
prohibitions but in the international community's willingness to
tolerate sexual abuse against women."1 1
99 Id. Rule 65(B), 33 I.L.M. at 521. Again, these are greater protections than exist in the
United States. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (1997) (proscribing U.S. rule for release or
detention of defendant pending trial, which is dependent upon whether defendant might
endanger safety of any other person).
1O0 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 92, at Rule 34.
(A) There shall be set up under the authority of the Register a Victims and Wit-
nesses Unit consisting of qualified staff to:
(i) recommend protective measures for victims and witnesses in accordance with ar-
ticle 22 of the Statute; and
(ii) provide counseling and support for them, in particular in cases of rape and sex-
ual assault.
(B) Due consideration shall be given, in the appointment of staff, to the employment
of qualified women.
Id.
101 WOMEN's HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 7 (contending that international prohibi-
tion of rape during war was not condemned or enforced as vigorously as other crimes).
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An examination of the history of wartime rape supports this as-
sertion. For example, notwithstanding Henry V's "severe prohibi-
tion of rape," that law and others like it were "'not effectively en-
forced throughout most of the Hundred Years War."' 102 Indeed,
"the license to rape was considered a major incentive for the sol-
dier involved in siege warfare;" the lawfulness of sacking a city
was recognized "if 'the necessities of war' required it, 'or as a spur
to the courage of the troops', even when rape would result.' 0 3
Rape has also been tolerated and even encouraged during mod-
ern warfare. For example, "[diuring the Second World War, rape
was tolerated and, horrifyingly, was even utilized in some in-
stances as an instrument of policy.... Moroccan mercenary troops
fought with Free French forces in Italy in 1943 on 'terms [which]
included [as a spur to masculine courage] license to rape.' 1 0 4
In occupied Europe, thousands of women were subjected to rape
and thousands more were forced to enter brothels for Nazi
troops. 0 15 Additionally, the Japanese army forced thousands of
Korean women to work as "comfort girls" in Japanese army broth-
els. 0 6 Yet even after the large-scale rapes committed during
World War II, the Allies failed to prosecute anyone for rape at Nu-
remberg, although the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East did bring some rape prosecutions.10 7
Small wonder, then, that this attitude persisted in the Bosnian
civil war, with the warring parties doing virtually nothing to stop
rape or to prosecute the perpetrators.108 The Tribunal to date has
102 HENRY'S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAws, supra note 53, at 111 (citation omitted)
(discussing rape laws during King Henry's reign, which also were not enforced).
103 Id. at 112 (quoting F. DE VrroRA, DE INDIS ET DE URE BELLI RELECTIONES) (John
Pawley Bate trans. & Ernest Nys ed., 1917).
104 HENRYS WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAws, supra note 53, at 110-115.
105 Id. at 113 (discussing lack of punishment given to perpetrators of rape, despite its
long time prohibition).
106 See, e.g., id. at 113 n.185 (noting instances of wartime rape occurring in Japan, Italy
and Germany).
107 See Rape as a War Crime, supra note 1, at 425-26 (discussing history of rape as war
crime and noting parallels and inaction in former Yugoslavia); see also Healy, supra note 7,
at 330 (reviewing historical inconsistent attempts to prosecute rape as war crime).
108 See WoMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 10-11. Others also have reported that
accountability through national courts in the former Yugoslavia has not worked. Id.; see,
e.g., No Justice, No Peace, supra note 39, at 98.
... following trials that have been criticized for their lack of procedural fairness, a
court in Sarajevo (in 1994) convicted two Serb soldiers, who had confessed to commit-
ting several rapes and murders of Bosnian Muslims, and sentenced the two to death.
Such trials may be rare, however, and in any event would take place under conditions
in which the independence of the trial court may be in doubt.
Id.
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been unable to alter this history. As discussed above, despite the
indictment of 77 suspects, many of whom have been accused of
rape, only twenty individuals are in custody and only three trials
have actually taken place.10 9 As noted above, in the only trial com-
pleted by the Tribunal so far, that of Dusan Tadic, the rape
charges were dropped because of threats to the victim's family. 110
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Despite the unencouraging start to rape prosecutions repre-
sented by the Tadic case, other suspects are in custody who have
been accused of rape."' In March 1997, an additional trial involv-
ing rape charges began, this time against Bosnian Muslims and a
Bosnian Croat arising out of crimes that they allegedly committed
at camps run by the Bosnian government. 1 2 Swift steps should be
taken to prevent the intimidation of rape victims and witnesses in
future cases before the Tribunal. Eliminating these problems can
obviously facilitate the successful prosecution of other war crimes
by the Tribunal. As discussed above, the procedural protections
provided by the Tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence provide
about as much protection as such rules could possibly provide. Ac-
cordingly, efforts must be focused elsewhere. The solutions are
basic and well-known to every criminal justice system.
First the international community should continue to do what it
has only recently started: Arrest the suspects that are currently
at large, by force if necessary. The North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation forces currently enforcing peace in Bosnia already have the
mandate to arrest war crimes suspects and have conducted some
raids, netting several suspects and killing another who fired on
109 See Charles Trueheart, New Chief Prosecutor for Balkans Says 'Arrests Are Acute
Priority', WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1996, at A14 (discussing problems confronting prosecutors
when few indictees are arrested or in custody); see also United Nations Convenes First
Balkans War-Crimes Trial, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 8, 1996, at A14 (discussing trial
of Dusan Tadik). See generally Paul J. Saunders, It's Not in U.S. Interest to Be World Cop,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 20, 1997, at A23 (discussing U.S. reluctance to participate in forcible arrest
of war criminals).
110 See Marshall, supra note 49, at 1 (stating that rape charges against Dusan Tadic
were dropped when victim decided not to testify); see also Comiteau & Sharpe, supra note
51, at A7 (reporting on tribunal's conviction of Dusan Tadic for his crimes against human-
ity and his role in ethnic persecution of Muslims).
111 See Two Indicted on War Crimes Extradited to the Hague, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1996,
at A4 (noting Bosnian government extradited two Muslim prison camp officials accused of
murdering and raping Bosnian Serb inmates for trial before Tribunal).
112 See Croat, Muslims Face U.N. Tribunal, L.A. TIMES, March 11, 1997, at A6 (reporting
recent trial of accused war criminals).
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British soldiers. They have also been ordered to arrest Ratko
Mlatic, "but have avoided every opportunity to do so" for a variety
of reasons, including, in 1996, to avoid any incidents before the
Bosnian and U.S. elections. 1113 U.S. troops recently made their
first Bosnian war crimes arrest, of Goram Jelisic, a former Bos-
nian Serb prison camp commander accused of genocide, who called
himself the "Serb Adolf."" 4
More, however, must be done. Accused war criminals are still
left free to roam about Bosnia almost at will; only the Bosnian
government has cooperated fully and completely with the Tribu-
nal in trying to make arrests.1 5 According to Louis Arbour, the
Tribunal's Chief Prosecutor since October 1996, "'[tlhe kind of im-
punity that the indictees presently enjoy has always been used as
a justification for revenge and, if allowed to remain unchallenged,
it will perpetuate the vicious cycles of war.''11 6 It is not surprising
that victims and witnesses are afraid to speak up with so many
dangerous people at large.
Instead of arrests, NATO's ministers initially adopted a series
of half measures in the forlorn and naive hope that the parties to
113 DIE ZEIT, Aug. 30, 1996, at 4 (author's translation). Failure of NATO to arrest Mlatic
despite the mandate to arrest suspected war criminals was, in part, due to a desire to avoid
incidents before the United States and Bosnian elections. Id. In 1996, the efforts of the
NATO troops to avoid Mlatic reached a comical extreme when they refused to conduct an
inspection of Bosnian Serb headquarters precisely because Mlatic offered to give them a
tour of the facility. Id. As former Chief Prosecutor Goldstone noted shortly before the expi-
ration of his term, the troops "simply did not want to run into Miadic." Id. at 4; DIE ZEIT,
Sept. 20, 1996, at 3. In addition, during the Bosnian elections in September 1996, Radovan
Karadzic was "omnipresent," with posters of him hanging everywhere. The chair of
Karadzic's political party disingenuously said the presence of the posters was the result of
a "private initiative." Id.
114 See L.A. TIMEs, January 23, 1998, at A6.
115 See DIE ZEIT, Aug. 30, 1996, at 4. Only the Bosnian government has cooperated with
the Tribunal; the other parties to the conflict have been conspicuously absent in cooperat-
ing. Id. According to former Chief Prosecutor Goldstone, the Croatian government waited
three years to finally pass the laws necessary to ensure cooperation with the Tribunal,
which Mr. Goldstone noted was simply "too late." Id. Further, "indicted suspects move
about freely in Croatia without being arrested." Id. Cooperation from the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia has been "minimal," with the Tribunal's Belgrade representative only being
allowed to interview witnesses in the presence of a Serbian judge. Id. "Moreover, the Serbs
are not ready to extradite indictees." Id. Instead of cooperating with the Tribunal, the Bos-
nian Serbs pepper it with demands to indict the leaders of Croatia and Bosnia. Id.; see also
Philip Smucker, Suspect War Criminals Chill Tourism Prospects/Serbs Hope to Thaw Eco-
nomic Deep Freeze, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 15, 1996, at 30. The author discusses the lack of
cooperation with the Tribunal due to the Serb Republic signing the Dayton Accord and
Karadzic remaining in power. Id.
116 See William D. Montalbano, Aid to Bosnia Conditional, Nations Note Meeting: Inter-
national Community Ties Assistance to Balkan Countries Commitment to Peace Pact, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 6, 1996, at A16 (reporting that agreement stipulated that Western countries
would provide aid to Bosnia only if adverse parties sincerely worked toward peace).
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the conflict in Bosnia would make arrests themselves. 117 In late
1996, for example, Western countries meeting in London made
$1.8 billion in relief funds that they pledged to help rebuild Bosnia
conditional on stricter adherence by the former warring parties to
the terms of the Dayton Peace Accords that brought an end to the
war, including the arrest of indicted war crimes suspects still at
large. Notwithstanding that condition, "there were doubts at
the conference that there would be increased efforts to arrest
suspects."1 9
Also at the conference, Carl Bildt, a Swedish diplomat serving
as the civilian administrator of the Dayton Peace Agreement,
made a vague warning that "'further measures' would be consid-
ered if suspected criminals were not suspended or appre-
hended."120 What further measures? "The conference shied away
from a Canadian proposal that would have involved using
peacekeeping troops led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion to pursue suspects."' 2 ' Instead, the conference decided to cre-
ate a "special police intelligence unit that will seek to pinpoint the
accused criminals and facilitate their capture - though not un-
dertaking the capture itself. That is to be left to the authorities in
Bosnia." 12 2 Does anyone doubt that half-measures will not lead to
more arrests? Instead of arresting suspects, the international
community responded with ineffective window-dressing designed
to create the illusion of decisive action. The recent arrests given
the continuing lack of cooperation with the Tribunal disclosed
above, are a welcome change and, are the only way to bring many
of the suspects into custody.
The ability to prosecute other such individuals who intimidate
victims and witnesses, would also be welcome. Statutes authoriz-
117 See WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 9. Human rights monitors have ob-
served that they are unaware "of any case in which Bosnian Serb forces guilty of abuses
have been punished by their superiors for crimes." Id.; Michael Dobbs, Despite Obstacles
U.S. Wants Bosnia Vote on Time; Failure to Remove Indicted Serb Leaders Should Not
Change Schedule, Officials Say, WASH. POST, May 25, 1996, at A20. The United States has
tried to use political pressure to get the Bosnian Serbs to cooperate. Id.
118 See Montalbano, supra note 116, at A16 (reporting on London Peace Implementation
Conference).
119 Id. (stating Western countries have donated 1.8 billion dollars to help rebuild Bosnia,
provided that parties comply with Dayton peace agreement).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. See War Crimes and Punishment, supra note 30, at 52. The conference also ap-
proved more police resources for the Tribunal, which were long overdue and were badly
needed. Id.
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ing the prosecution of those responsible for obstructing justice are
natural, and necessary, corollaries to any effective criminal justice
system. For example, the United States has statutes criminaliz-
ing such conduct as tampering with a witness, victim or inform-
ant'2 3 and retaliation against a witness, victim or informant.124 So
far, however, the Tribunal has no mandate to conduct such prose-
cutions and there does not appear to be any likelihood of it ob-
taining such powers any time soon.
Failing enough arrests and a crackdown on intimidators, the
only way to make victims and witnesses feel absolutely secure is
to insulate them as completely as possible from those who wish to
harm them. It is unlikely that this can be done in the still-chaotic
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Accordingly, grants of asylum to victims and
witnesses and their families could be made available, with the
asylum program being publicized so that the victims and wit-
nesses will learn of it and take advantage of it.
125
There are weaknesses in such a proposal, however, that make it
an inadequate solution on its own.
Some victims, witnesses or their family members may not wish
to leave their homes in Bosnia for uncertain futures in foreign
countries. Asylum programs could also encourage false claims of
rape by individuals who wish to leave Bosnia for better lives else-
where, thereby undermining the credibility of legitimate victims.
Finally, the enormous amount of rapes committed in Bosnia,
which may run in the tens of thousands, 126 may make a broad
asylum program impossible because of the vast pool of eligible
individuals.
A limited asylum program would, however, be a very useful tool
for encouraging victims and witnesses to come forward in at least
(i) the few cases indicted so far in order to at a minimum begin
123 See 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (1994) (prohibiting use of intimidation or force to influence an-
other's legal testimony). See generally Tracey B. Fitzpatrick & Stacey L. Parker, Obstruc-
tion of Justice, 31 AM. CPmM. L. REV. 747, 761-764 (1994) (discussing application of § 1512 to
protect witnesses and their testimony).
124 See 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (1994). See generally Fitzpatrick & Parker, supra note 123, at
760 (describing protection from retaliation provided by § 1513 for testifying witnesses).
125 See War Crimes and Punishment, supra note 30, at 52; see also Fletcher, supra note
39, at 105 (asserting that "measures to provide protection of witnesses, including assur-
ances of relocation, are critical"). Id. at 127-28 (further suggesting that United States pro-
vide increased refugee allocations pursuant to 1980 Refugee Act and temporary protected
status for rape victims pursuant to Immigration Act of 1990).
126 For a collection of results from various surveys estimating the number of rapes in
Bosnia, see Healy, supra note 7, at 361-62.
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getting some convictions for rape; and, (ii) cases involving the
prosecution of prominent suspects, whose convictions would have
the greatest impact.
Care should also be taken in the repatriation of refugees from
other countries in order to ensure that victims and witnesses will
not be placed in danger. For example, at the end of 1996, more
than 300,000 Bosnian refugees were in Germany; the pre-war
homes for two-thirds of them were in territory occupied by the
Bosnian Serbs.' 2 7 Germany was scheduled to return those individ-
uals by April 1997 and was prepared, if necessary, to force their
return to Bosnia through the use of immigration proceedings and
in some cases did so. 2 ' The safety of victims and witnesses de-
mands strict attention.
CONCLUSION
At the end of his term as Chief Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone
remarked that the Tribunal has had an educational effect at the
international level, with the result that "newspapers in many
countries, particularly in Europe and North America, write almost
daily about war crimes in a way that was unthinkable several
years ago. I believe that has had a deterring effect on certain
political military leaders." 12 9 The Tribunal has indeed come a long
way from where it was in May 1994, "when hardly anyone took
the Yugoslavian Tribunal seriously. Today it grabs headlines,
pressures politicians, and stirs up the public."130 But that is not
enough.
Simply put, without enforcement there is no law. The Tribunal,
which has so much potential to strike a telling blow against the
centuries-old toleration of the war crime of rape, is once again at
another one of its critical crossroads. If the Tribunal is unable to
127 See DIE ZEIT, Sept. 20, 1996, at 1 (describing number of Bosnian refugees in Germany
and difficulties repatriating them); see also Ulrik Davy, Refugees From Bosnia and Herze-
govina: Are They Genuine?, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 53, 129-30 n.245 (1995) (dis-
cussing Germany's asylum program which led to influx of Bosnian refugees).
128 See DIE ZErr, Sept. 20, 1996, at 1 (listing measures needed for repatriation of Bosnian
refugees); see also Bavaria Expels Bosnia Refugees, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 10, 1996,
at A18 (noting Bavaria was first of German states to expel Bosnian war refugees); Ray
Moselet, Savaged Bosnia Refugees Afraid To Go Home Germany Plans To Eject Thousands;
U.N. Protests, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 1996, at 1 (discussing Germany's plan to return problem-
atic refugees to Bosnia).
129 See DIE ZEIT, Aug. 30 1996, at 4, col. 1 (describing impact and importance of Tribunal
and difficulties it has faced).
130 Id.
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successfully prosecute criminals and protect their victims, it will
lose all credibility and demonstrate that humanitarian law should
mean noting to those inclined to violate it.
Now that the Tribunal is trying some cases, it is time for the
vacillating international community to step up to the plate and
make the Tribunal work. For centuries the world has witnessed
the devastating effect of rape as a weapon of war. It is critical,
and long overdue, for the world to see that the Tribunal is an even
more effective weapon in the arsenals of peace and justice.

